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Abstract
This paper empirically investigates two important determinants of international activity through wholly owned operations,
joint-ventures and technology licensing, namely country risk and intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection. Using a compre-
hensive database on investments in chemical plants during the period 1981–1996, we show that higher levels of country risk are
associated with less activity into recipient economies. The analysis also suggests that international activity with smaller resource
commitment tends to be preferred in countries with higher levels of risk, and that multinational investment is more responsive
to changes in risk conditions than indigenous investment. After controlling for several country characteristics, we do not fin
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wPRs protection playing a significan role in fostering international activity or conditioning its mode.
EL classification: F21; F23; O32; O34
eywords: Foreign direct investment; Technology licensing; Country risk; IPRs protection; Chemical processing industry
. Introduction
The past decade has been marked by the upsurge
f firms involvement outside national borders. The
002 World Investment Report shows that the world-
ide fl w of foreign direct investment has passed from
∗ Tel.: +34 91 624 9351; fax: +34 91 624 9608.
E-mail address: andrea.fosfuri@uc3m.es.
slightly more than $200 billion in 1992 to about $700
billion in 2001. Arora et al. (2001) have stressed the
increased importance of market-based transactions for
technology in the last two decades of the XX cen-
tury. Their estimates indicate a worldwide market for
technologies in the range of $35–50 billion, of which
a large chunk is due to cross-border deals. Interna-
tional alliances and joint-ventures have also become
widespread in the last few years.
1
From a strategic point of view, since the need to ex-
ploit technological assets outside national borders has
become more and more imperative, companies must
have a good understanding of trends in international
expansion. From a policy point of view, governments
seeking to attract international technology must be
concerned about the factors that enhance or hinder
foreign direct investment and licensing, which are
leading channels through which technology moves
across borders. This papers focuses on two important
determinants of international activity through wholly
owned operations, joint-ventures and technology li-
censing, namely country risk and intellectual property
rights (IPRs) protection.
Although all business transactions involve some de-
gree of risk, when they occur across international bor-
ders they carry additional risks not present in domestic
transactions. Country risk analysis rests on the funda-
mental premise that growing imbalances in economic,
social, or political factors increase the risk of shortfall
in the expected return of an investment. The available
evidence shows that many countries have experienced
important changes in their idiosyncratic risk during the
1990s. Indeed, countries like Yugoslavia and Iraq have
more than doubled their level of risk. Similarly, coun-
tries like Indonesia, Cameroon, Pakistan and Algeria
have experimented very significan increases. On the
other side, Poland, El Salvador, Peru, Costa Rica and
Panama have more than halved their level of country
risk.1
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The main objective of this paper is to offer a closer
look at the impact of country risk on the international
activity of multinational firms By exploiting a com-
prehensive data set on plant-level investments in the
worldwide chemical processing industry during the pe-
riod 1981–1996, we are able to distinguish between
three modes of international expansion: wholly owned
operations, joint-ventures and technology licensing.2
We account for the simultaneity of the mode choice. In
addition, we estimate the relative effect of country risk
on wholly owned operations, joint-ventures and tech-
nology licensing, and disentangle the impact of country
risk on investments by local and multinational firms
The second objective of this research is to address
the ongoing debate on the importance of policies aimed
at stricter enforcement of IPRs. Advocates of these
policies argue that stronger IPRs protection would en-
hance technology fl ws and foreign downstream in-
vestment in the recipient countries. This view has
been echoed in the introduction of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs). Opponents suggest that stricter enforcement
of IPRs would reinforce the monopoly power of large
multinational corporations. Indeed, many developing
economies are not eager to strengthen their IPR legis-
lation and its enforcement fearing that the losses result-
ing from this action would outweigh the benefits After
controlling for other country characteristics, our results
show that, at least for the chemical processing indus-
try, international activity through wholly owned opera-
t
s
A
n
2
a
o
c
f
b
c
i
tFirms, and managers in particular, seem to place
lot of attention on the changes of investment
onditions in different countries. Anecdotal facts
uggest that rises in country-specifi risk have an
mmediate effect on international investment that is
ften considered footloose and ready to move to safer
laces. The proliferation of country ratings, which
hould serve as an aid to decision-making in the
ssessment of country risks, and the rise of specialized
onsultancy companies, like Control Risks Group,
rovide further evidence of the close relationship
etween international investment and country-specifi
isk.
1 These figure are obtained by comparing the Institutional In-
estor Credit Ratings (IICR) of the different countries at the begin-
ing of the year 1990 and at the end of 1999. See later for details on
he IICR.ions, joint-ventures and technology licensing does not
eem to be sensitive to the degree of protection of IPRs.
t the very least, this suggests that further research is
eeded to support either of the two sides of the debate.
. Related literature and contribution
The main contribution of this paper is to provide
systematic and econometrically sound investigation
f two important determinants of international activity:
ountry risk and IPRs protection.
2 The chemical processing industry constitutes an ideal test-bed
or addressing our research questions since it is a global technology-
ased industry. Moreover, the amount of investment to start up a
hemical plant is substantial, whichmakes country risk analysismore
mportant. In addition, the industry has developed a long tradition of
echnology licensing.
2
There is an empirical literature focused on country
risk as an explanatory factor for the amount of foreign
direct investment in a given country. However, little is
known about other channels of international expansion,
most notably technology licensing.We also distinguish
between wholly owned operations and joint-ventures.
One of the firs studies that analyzed the relationship
between risk and foreign direct investment is Flamm
(1984). He estimates an equation relating multi-
national electronics investments to relative wages,
using country-specifi dummy variables as proxies for
differential risk. His results seem to suggest that firm
are very much concerned with having a balanced risky
portfolio so they respond quickly to changes in country
risk. Wheeler and Mody (1992) also investigate the
impact of country-specifi risk on foreign direct
investment. They measure risk as a firs principal
component extracted from a set of indices which
measure political stability, inequality, corruption, red
tape, quality of the legal system, cultural compatibility,
attitude toward foreign capital and general expatriate
comfort. They fin that firm seem to assign little
importance to perceived risk, except for some modest
weight attached to geopolitical considerations. Bevan
and Estrin (2000), using a panel data set containing
information on foreign direct investment fl ws from
18 market economies to 11 transition economies over
the period 1994–1998, fin that foreign direct invest-
ment infl ws are strongly influence by country risk,
among other factors. More recently, Alburquerque
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of country risk mean less international activity, which
tends to be more market-based. Finally, we disentangle
the impact of country risk on investments by local and
multinational firms and show that international invest-
ment tends to be more footloose and ready to move to
safer places.
This paper also contributes to the growing literature
on international technology transfers and IPRs protec-
tion. The finding of this literature have been mixed so
far (Maskus, 1998). For instance, Lee and Mansfiel
(1996) report a positive and significan impact of IPRs
on foreign direct investment fl ws. However, Fink
(1997) shows that, if it exists at all, the relationship
between IPRs and multinational activity is negative.
Few studies have addressed the link between other
means of international technology transfers and IPRs.
Smith (2001) shows that IPRs have a positive and
significan effect both on foreign direct investment and
licensing. The effect is more pronounced for licensing
and tends to be stronger in countries with strong
imitative abilities. However, Branstetter et al. (2002)
fin no evidence of an increase in technology licensing
to unaffiliate parties due to stricter enforcement
of IPRs, and Maskus et al. (2003) report that in
lower-technology industries it is more likely that
stronger IPRs would induce firm to shift toward
lesser use of licensing. In our paper, we cannot fin
any significan relationship between the strength of
IPRs protection and the fl ws of international activity,
irregardless of the mode chosen by the investor.
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t2003), using aggregate data on investment in a large
et of countries, shows that the share of foreign
irect investment infl ws to gross fl ws is negatively
orrelated to several creditworthiness and country
isk ratings. He argues that foreign direct investment
s harder to expropriate than other financia fl ws.
owever, he does not provide estimates of the impact
f country risk on the absolute volume of foreign direct
nvestment.
Our paper shows that thewhole fl w of international
ctivity into a recipient economy is negatively related
o the level of country risk. Moreover, this effect holds
or all three modes considered in our analysis, namely
holly owned operations, joint-ventures and technol-
gy licensing. In addition, we are also able to show
hat the relative effect is stronger for modes that in-
olve greater commitment with the recipient country,
uch as wholly owned operations. In sum, higher levelsTwo important limitations should be noted. First, we
o not have exports figures so our analysis is limited to
nternational expansion modes that imply the transfer
f production to the recipient country. A fir could ex-
loit its technological advantage abroad simply by pro-
ucing at home and serving the foreign market through
xports. Second, we have data from only one industry,
o that the extent to which our results can be exported
o other industries remains unclear.3
3 The lack of exports figure might not be a serious problem in the
hemical processing industry where the key upstream input – tech-
ology – is easier to move across locations, while the fina products
chemicals such as ammonia and ethylene) are costly to transport.
oncerning the applicability of our results to other industries, we
elieve that they should be extendable to other global high-tech in-
ustries (for instance, electronics). The test of this conjecture is left
o future research.
3
3. Theoretical background and hypotheses
Most theoretical research on firms international-
ization builds on the premise that firm have assets that
confer them an advantage in servicing a foreign market
(Hymer, 1976). Such assets include intangibles such as
knowledge and technology. Firms firs decide whether
to serve the foreign market through exports or by lo-
cating the production abroad. Once the decision to lo-
cate the production abroad is taken, firm have several
modes available to organize their international activity,
among them, wholly owned operations, joint-ventures
and technology licensing (Dunning, 1981; Markusen,
1995). In this paper, we will focus only on interna-
tional activity that implies the transfer of production in
the foreign country.
The relationship between risk and the level of inter-
national activity in a country is straightforward. Other
things being equal, higher country risk reduces the ex-
pected profit from international investment and hence
the propensity to invest (Wheeler and Mody, 1992).
So, one should expect a reduction in the expected prof-
its of any of the three forms of international expan-
sion analyzed here.4 This is straightforward in the case
of wholly owned operations, where the investor is the
residual claimant of all possible profits and in the case
of joint-ventures, where the investor typically receives
a share of the whole profits but it is also true for tech-
nology licensing, where royalties and other types of
payments tend to be, although spuriously, related to the
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Notice that this does not imply that the fl w of each
of the three forms of international activity considered
here increases when the level of country risk decreases.
In fact, the relative effect of changes in the level of
country risk is more subtle. The three modes involve a
very different level of resource commitment (Dunning,
1981; Hill et al., 1990). By resource commitment we
mean dedicated assets that cannot be redeployed to al-
ternative uses without cost (loss of value). These assets
may be tangible (e.g. physical plant) or intangible (e.g.
management know-how). In the case of technology li-
censing, the licensee bears most of the costs of open-
ing up and serving the foreign market. In the case of a
wholly owned operation, the investor has to bear all of
the costs. The level of resource commitment consistent
with a joint-venture will fall somewhere between these
two extremes.
Where country risk is high, the investor might be
well advised to limit its exposure to it by reducing
its resource commitments and increasing its ability to
exit from the market quickly without taking a substan-
tial loss should the environment worsen. This suggests
that, other things being equal, technology licensing and
joint-ventures will be favored over wholly owned op-
erations when country risk is high. In turn, this im-
plies that higher country risk has a negative effect on
the fl w of wholly owned operations. The effect on
joint-ventures and technology licensing is less clear-
cut. For instance, consider technology licensing. On
the one hand, we have argued above that the expected
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fxpected profit obtainable through the exploitation of
he technology.
Let the outside best option for the investor (it could
e not serving at all a given foreignmarket or exporting)
e independent of (or less respondent to) changes in
ountry risk, then the following proposition follows
mmediately:
roposition1. Theflowof international activity into a
iven country is negatively related to the level of coun-
ry risk.
4 Alburquerque (2003) shows that foreign direct investment has a
haring risk advantage over other capital fl ws because an important
omponent of foreign direct investment is due to intangible assets that
re inalienable to a large extent. Thismakes foreign direct investment
ess sensitive to country risk vis-a`-vis other financia fl ws.rofit from technology licensing tend to reduce with
isk, as do the incentives to employ this mode of in-
ernational expansion. On the other hand, higher risk
ight force firm willing to exploit their technological
ssets internationally to opt for modes with reduced
esource commitment. In other words, with higher lev-
ls of country risk, technology licensing becomes rel-
tively more appealing than wholly owned investment.
his latter effect increases the fl w of licensed tech-
ology. The net result is ambiguous and technology
icensing fl ws theoretically might either increase or
ecrease with country risk. This is therefore an empir-
cal question that we will address with the data. What
s unambiguous is that the coefficien of country risk
n technology licensing fl ws must be smaller than the
oefficien of country risk on fl ws of wholly owned
perations. A similar argument could be put forward
or joint-ventures that, as far as resource commitment,
4
fall somewhere between wholly owned operations and
technology licensing.
Proposition 2. The impact of changes in country risk
on the flow of wholly owned operations is larger than
the impact on the flow of joint-ventures that, in turn,
is larger than the impact on the flow of technology li-
censing.
That multinational investment responds negatively
to increasing degrees of country risk is, although cor-
rect, not too surprising in the light of historical evi-
dence and industrial practice. Perhaps more interesting
is the asymmetry between local and international in-
vestments in the response to changes in risk conditions.
Indeed, all business transactions involve some degree
of risk. However, when business transactions occur
across international borders, they carry additional risks
not present in domestic transactions. Anecdotal facts
suggest that rises in country-specifi risk have an im-
mediate effect on international investment which is of-
ten consideredmore footloose and able tomove to safer
places. There are at least three possible arguments that
can justify this position: First, local firm have a bet-
ter understanding of country idiosyncrasies, so they are
better equipped to manage risk. Second, their resource
commitment might be substantially smaller than the
one a foreign fir needs to undertake. Finally, their out-
side investment options are probably less interesting,
so they would undertake riskier investments or ones
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investment in the recipient country. This is known as
the “market power effect”. See Smith (2001) for further
discussion. There is more consensus in the literature
about the relative impact of stricter enforcement of
IPRs on the use of different modes. The reference
framework here is the so-called “eclectic paradigm”
(Dunning, 1981). Such a paradigm suggests that, once
a fir has decided to locate production abroad, the
choice between different entry channels, most notably,
foreign direct investment and technology licensing,
depends of what Dunning labels “internalization ad-
vantages”. Applying the insights of the transaction cost
theory (Williamson, 1991), this approach suggests that,
absent significan contracting hazards, the ‘default’
low-cost governance mechanism is a simple contract.
However, writing and executing a reliable contract for
the use of technology requires adequate specificatio
of property rights, monitoring and enforcement of
contractual terms – any of which may be problematic.
Stronger IPRs favor market-based transactions such
as licensing because they force firm to better codify
their knowledge in order to benefi from the protection
of the intellectual property (Arora and Gambardella,
1994), reduce transaction costs by moderating the
risk of opportunistic behavior by the licensees (Teece,
1986), and are a necessary condition for the rise
of specialized technology suppliers, which in turn
constitute a stimulus to market-based transactions in
technology (Arora et al., 2001). However, two recent
papers have defie this traditional wisdom. Arora and
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with smaller expected benefits We can therefore state
he following:
roposition 3. Multinational investment is more re-
ponsive to changes in country risk than local invest-
ent.
As far as IPRs are concerned the absolute effect of
hanges in the strength of protection on any form of
nternational activity considered here is far from being
heoretically clear-cut. On the one hand, stronger IPRs
rovide legal recourse against imitation by foreign
irm and thus, make more appealing the exploitation
f technological assets abroad. This is known as the
market expansion effect”. On the other hand, stronger
PRs also confer to the foreign fir more market
ower, which can be exploited by reducing the supply
f products, by rising the price, and restricting theeccagnoli (2004) argue that on the one hand, stronger
PRs increase the efficien y of licensing contracts and
hus the net surplus captured by the patent holder, but
n the other hand, enhance the value of innovation and
hus raise the opportunity cost of licensing. The net
ffect is therefore ambiguous. Maskus et al. (2003)
o even further and claim that stricter enforcement of
PRs might reduce the use of licensing contracts in fa-
or of wholly-owned investment in lower-technology
ndustries.
. Model specification and data
.1. Specification
We assume that international activity through
holly owned operations, joint-ventures and technol-
5
ogy licensing is a function of a set of variables which
should account for the demand in a given country, of
risk conditions, of the degree of IPRs protection and of
some control parameters.
Among the country variables we include income per
capita, population and distance. These three variables
are intended to capture respectively for relative endow-
ments, market size and transportation costs. Markusen
(1995) provides a survey of models that generate these
core explanatory variables.
As control parameters, we have considered the
country level of education and the country openness
to trade.5
We apply the following specification
TFijt = α0INCOMEitα1POPitα2DISTiα3HUMANitα4
×OPENitα5Ritα6 IPRitα7εijt (1)
where the subscripts i denotes the country, t the time
period, and j the mode (wholly owned, joint-venture
or technology licensing). INCOME is the per capita
income of the country, POP the population, DIST the
weighted distance to capitals of world 20 major ex-
porters, HUMAN a measure of the country level of ed-
ucation, OPEN openness to trade, R country risk, IPR
the degree of IPRs protection, and εijt a log normally
distributed error term. TFijt is the fl w of wholly owned
operations, joint-ventures and technology licensing, re-
spectively.
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Notice that we do not take the log of OPEN because
this variable is a share.6
We expect positive parameters for INCOME and
POP in all equations. The theoretical literature lacks
consensus on whether transportation costs (DIST)
and trade barriers (OPEN) increase or decrease
international investments. For example, foreign direct
investment or technology licensing might be a way
to circumvent high transportation costs or barriers
to exports (the so-called “tariff-jumping argument”;
see Motta, 1992). However, models of complement
behavior predict that conditions which decrease
(increase) exports also decrease (increase) technology
transfer modes which involve location in the foreign
country (Smith, 2001). Finally, the sign of HUMAN
is also ambiguous. The level of education might
capture the “absorptive capacity” of the recipient
country (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). In this case,
better educated workers available in the host country
would facilitate both the creation of a wholly owned
activity, the establishment of a joint-venture with a
local partner and the transmission of technological
knowledge to any potential licensee. However, higher
level of education – better technological skills – might
imply that local firm are better equipped for quickly
imitating the technology of the foreign company. This
means that the investor will try to protect its tech-
nology, reduce if possible any technological leakage,
and ultimately restrict the amount of investment and
technology transfer to the recipient country.
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iTaking natural logs of Eq. (1) one obtains the fol-
owing:
n(TFijt) = α0 + α1 ln(INCOMEit)+ α2 ln(POPit)
+α3 ln(DISTi)+ α4 ln(HUMANit)
+α5(OPENit)+ α6 ln(Rit)
+α7 ln(IPRit)+ εijt (2)
5 We have experimented with several other variables, like barri-
rs to trade of capital goods, financia openness, country’s latitude,
ummy for major non-oil exporter, dummy for major oil exporter,
ummy for major oil producer, capital account restrictions, etc. Most
f them showed an insignifican coefficien and the inclusion or ex-
lusion did not affect the results reported here. For brevity, we do
ot report these results, which are available from the author upon
equest..2. Data
Data on wholly owned operations, joint-ventures
nd technology licensing are obtained from Chem-
ntell, a large commercial database on worldwide
nvestments in chemical plants during the period
981–1996. Chemintell is comprehensive, including
lmost the full population of chemical plants. For each
hemical plant, the database reports both the name of
he operating company and the name of the licensor
hen the technology used in the plant is bought from
n unaffiliate source. In addition, it identifie when
6 Both IPR and R are indexes which vary on a scale from 0 to 5
with 5 meaning the highest level of IPRs protection) and from 0 to
00 (with 100 meaning the lowest level of country risk) respectively.
or IPR we have used log(1 + IPR). Since for R, the minimum value
s 4.7, we have simply taken the log.
6
Table 1
Distribution of plants (number and value of investment) by geographic areas during the period 1981–1996 in the chemical industry (by the firm
of our sample)
AF EE FE JAP ME NA SA WE Total
WO
Number 75 15 562 120 27 988 316 1195 3298
Value 8.0 1.0 53.9 5.2 3.5 71.1 32.2 63.4 238.3
Share 34 5 38 39 9 82 57 73 55
JV
Number 19 52 303 72 92 46 57 105 746
Value 2.0 3.5 29.1 3.1 12.1 3.3 5.8 5.6 64.5
Share 9 19 20 23 32 4 10 6 13
LIC
Number 127 207 627 119 167 165 179 327 1918
Value 13.6 14.1 60.2 5.1 21.9 11.9 18.3 17.3 162.4
Share 57 76 42 38 59 14 33 21 32
Total
Number 221 274 1492 311 286 1199 552 1627 5962
Value 23.6 18.6 143.2 13.4 37.5 86.3 56.3 86.3 465.2
Note: Value in billions of US dollars. AF: Africa; EE: Eastern Europe; FE: Far East (including Australia); JAP: Japan; ME: Middle East; NA:
North America; SA: South America; WE: Western Europe.
the property of a given plant is shared among different
firms In other words, using our database it is possible
to track the entire set of wholly owned and co-owned
plants in foreign countries and the whole fl w of in-
ternational technology licensing in the chemical pro-
cessing industry during the period under study. The
database also provides information about plant invest-
ment costs.
In order to identify the plants belonging to each
mode of international activity, we have constructed a
sample of large chemical firms Such firms given their
large financial managerial and organizational capa-
bilities, were likely to have the option to decide the
preferred mode of activity in any recipient country.
Small chemical firm and, in particular, specialized en-
gineering firm (SEFs), which are also active in in-
ternational technology licensing, have to restrict their
strategy space to whether they want to license or not.
Since wewould like to consider a frameworkwhere the
mode of international activity is a decision variable for
the investor, our sample is better suited for the type of
analysis we are going to perform.
Our sample includes all chemical firm from de-
veloped countries (Western Europe, USA and Canada,
and Japan) which had, by the year 1988, more than $1
billion in aggregate sales (the list of firm is obtained
from Aftalion, 1991). Of this set of firm only 153 had
at least one international plant (either as owner, co-
owner or licensor) reported in Chemintell during the
period under study (see Appendix A). Firms of our
sample cover about 50% of all foreign direct invest-
ments and more than 30% of international technology
licensing.
Table 1 shows the distribution of plants (number
and value of the investment generated) by the firm of
our sample across geographical areas during the period
1981–1996.Notice that technology licensing is the pre-
dominant mode in most third world areas (the only ex-
ception is South America). On the contrary, technology
licensing accounts for less than 20% inmost developed
areas. Here, the exception is Japan where technology
licensing accounts for about 40% of all international
activity by the firm of our sample.7
There is also some variation across sub-subsectors.
For instance, sub-sectors like Plastics and Industrial
Gases show technology licensing as the predominant
7 There is also some variation across firms nationality. US and
European firm (globally taken) tend to behave similarly with about
25% of licensing activity. Japanese firm have a stronger attitude
towards technology licensing which accounts for 60% of their inter-
national activity.7
mode. On the other extreme, in Pharmaceuticals and
Organic Chemicals wholly owned operations account
for more than 90 and 75%, respectively. This suggests
that there might be factors related to the technology
which could be lost at a country-level aggregation.
Some technologies might be more standardized, eas-
ier to transfer through contracts (Kogut and Zander,
1993) or there might exist more competition in the
licensing market (see Arora and Fosfuri, 2003). All
these factors favor a more extensive use of technol-
ogy licensing. We will try to partially control for this
technology-specifi heterogeneity in our regressions in
Section 5.
We aggregate our data in four time periods:
1981–1983, 1984–1987, 1988–1991, 1992–1996.8
Hence, we use the subindex t= 1,2,3,4 for each of the
four periods, respectively. There are three reasons for
such aggregation. First, some country variables do not
basically show variability from one year to another.
Second, it typically takes several months or years from
the decision to build a chemical plant to the completion
of the investment. So, investment decisions tend to be
correlated to long term rather than short term changes
in country conditions. Third, in many countries (espe-
cially, the smaller ones) and for many years the fl ws
of international activity would be zero.
Our dependent variable is the fl w of international
activity by the firm of our sample in a given coun-
try and in a given time period. As discussed above we
distinguish between wholly owned operations, joint-
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above. The list of countries is reported in the appendix.
We have therefore a panel of 300 observations. Notice
that the cross-time variability is quite modest for some
country variables (like for instance IPR). For others,
like R, is much more important.
For INCOME, POP and OPEN we have used the
Pennworld tables (which are available on-line at http://
datacentre.chass.utoronto.ca/pwt/). DIST and HU-
MAN have been obtained from Barro and Lee (1994).
(Available on-line at http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/Econ-
omics/Growth/barlee htm.)
We measure the strength of IPRs using an index de-
veloped by Ginarte and Park (1997).9 This index uses
a coding scheme applied to national patent laws, where
fi e categories are considered: extent of coverage,
membership in international patent agreements, provi-
sions for loss of protection, enforcement mechanisms
and duration of protection. It has been extensively used
in previous studies (see, among others, Smith, 2001;
Oxley, 1999; Smarzynska, 2003). One limitation of this
measure is that it is based on statutory protection,which
might actually differ from the real protection (whether
patent laws are enforced or not). We have also experi-
mented with the index developed by Rapp and Rozek
(1990). This index is only available for the mid 80s
and reflect the conformity of national patent laws with
minimum standards proposed by the US Chamber of
Commerce. Both indexes are highly correlated and us-
ing one instead of the other does not affect any of the
results.
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tentures and technology licensing.
All our explanatory variables that have timevariabil-
ty are measured at the beginning of each time period.
he only exception is our measure of IPRs which is
nly available for the year 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995
we have, therefore, assumed that these correspond re-
pectively to our four periods).
We use a set of 75 countries for which we could col-
ect comparable data on the characteristics described
8 There are respectively 1507, 1599, 2090 and 744 international
lants by the firm of our sample in each period. The smaller number
f plants in the last period is more likely to be due to misrepresenta-
ion in Chemintell rather than a reduction in the pace of international
nvestment. Indeed, the shares of wholly owned investments, joint-
entures and technology licensing remain quite stable across all pe-
iods. As a robustness check we have excluded the last period from
ur analysis, and experimented with slightly different time periods.
esults only change marginally.As a proxy of country risk we use the Institutional
nvestor Credit Ratings (IICR). Institutional investor
redit ratings are based on a survey of leading interna-
ional bankers who are asked to rate each country on
scale from zero to 100 (where 100 represents max-
mum creditworthiness). Factors which are taken into
onsideration in thismeasure include the economic and
olitical outlook, debt service, financia reserves, fis
al policy, access to capital market, trade balance and
nvestments. To assess the sensitivity of the results we
lso use a weighted average of the political, economic
nd financia risks developed by the Political Risk Ser-
ices’ International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). This
easure is only available starting from the mid 1980s
9 I would like to thank ProfessorWalter Park for kindly supplying
he measure of patent protection used in this paper.
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Table 2
Variables and sources
Variable Description Source
ALLit Investment in country i and period t generated by the international activity
of our sample firm (in millions of US dollars)
Chemintell (1996)
WOit Investment in country i and period t generated by wholly owned operations
of our sample firm (in millions of US dollars)
Chemintell (1996)
JVit Investment in country i and period tgenerated by joint-ventures of our sample
firm (in millions of US dollars)
Chemintell (1996)
LICit Investment in country i and period t generated by technology licensing of
our sample firm (in millions of US dollars)
Chemintell (1996)
SEFit Investment in country i and period t generated by technology licensing of
specialized engineering firm (in millions of US dollars)
Chemintell (1996)
LOCALit Investment in country i and period t by local firm (in millions of US dollars) Chemintell (1996)
INCOMEit (Real) income per capita in country i at the beginning of period t (in US
dollars)
Penn World Table
POPit Population of country i at the beginning of period t (in thousands) Penn World Table
DISTi Weighted distance of country i’s capital to capitals of 20 major exporters (in
kilometers)
Barro and Lee (1994)
HUMANit Averaged schooling years in the total population over age 25 in country i at
the beginning of period t
Barro and Lee (1994)
OPENit (Exports + imports)/GDP at current international prices in country i at the
beginning of period t
Penn World Table
IPRit Strengthof patent protection in country i at period t. This is an indexwhich ac-
counts for the extent of patent coverage, membership in international patent
agreements, provisions for loss of protection, enforcement mechanisms and
duration of protection
Ginarte and Park (1997)
Rit Global index of risk in country i at the beginning of period t Institutional Investor Credit Rating
R2it Composite index of risk (political, financia and economic) in country i at
the beginning of period t
Erb et al. (1996)
DWEAKi Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the country has less than 500
scientists and engineers per million of population and zero otherwise
Statistical Yearbook (UNESCO)
DSTRONGi Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the country has more than 500
scientists and engineers per million of population and zero otherwise
Statistical Yearbook (UNESCO)
Time fi ed effects Dummy variables for the following time periods: 1981–1983, 1984–1987,
1988–1991, 1992–1996
Chemintell (1996)
and it is highly correlated with the Institutional In-
vestor Credit Ratings.10 We fin that our results are
robust with respect to the choice of measure. Regres-
sions are available from the author upon request. The
Institutional Investor Credit Ratings have been used by
Bevan and Estrin (2000) to assess the impact of coun-
try risk on foreign direct investment in a set of transi-
tion economies. Other papers, like Wheeler and Mody
(1992), have used more complex measures of country
risk. We favor an approach in which the country risk
is proxied by information actually available to firm at
10 The correlation (computed over 72 countries and 3 time peri-
ods) is above 0.9. Alternative measures of country risk, like the one
developed by Euromoney and the Moody’s ratings, are also highly
correlated with the Institutional Investor Credit Ratings.
the time of the investment decision – the credit ratings
– which can be purchased commercially.
Finally, we include dummy variables to control for
timeperiod fi ed effects. For completeness,we also add
a specificatio that includes country-specifi random
effects.
Table 2 summarizes our variables along with their
sources, whereas Table 3 provides some basic descrip-
tive statistics.
It is important to notice that some regressors tend
to be correlated. In particular, the correlation between
R, IPR, INCOME and HUMAN is always greater than
0.5. However, a condition number test does not suggest
that multicollinearity is a serious issue (Greene, 1993).
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics (n= 300)
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
ALLit 1375.0 2598.3 0 16402
WOit 783.5 1882.7 0 13924
JVit 153.9 376.5 0 2772
LICit 437.7 998.1 0 12996
SEFit 617.7 1109.5 0 7310
LOCALit 3331.5 7729.6 0 68600
INCOMEit 6730 5641 439 24518
POPit 54390 153428 231 1164951
DISTi 5662 2562 1267 11500
HUMANit 5.3 2.7 0.9 12
OPENit 65.8 51.0 12.9 427.9
IPRit 2.67 0.94 0 4.86
Rit 46.5 25.8 4.7 98.3
R2it 64.2
a 16.5 25.5 94.0
DWEAKi 0.427 0.495 0 1
DSTRONGi 0.573 0.495 0 1
a Only available for 72 countries and 3 time periods.
Before turning to the empirical results, two impor-
tant caveats about our explanatory variables are due
here. First, whereas our dependent variables are mea-
sured at the country-industry level, all explanatory vari-
ables are measured at the aggregate country level. For
instance,we are implicitly assuming that the level of ed-
ucation in the Chinese chemical industry corresponds
Table 4
OLS and Tobit estimations: ALLit
OLS: ALLit TOBIT: ALLit GLS random effects
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1
Constant −27.48*** −30.010*** −33.73
INCOMEit 1.144*** 1.430*** 1.49
POPit 1.209*** 1.270*** 1.40
DISTi 0.444 0.267 0.41
HUMANit −0.605* −0.295 −0.85
OPENit 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.00
IPRit 0.384 0.59
DWEAK× IPRit −0.012
DSTRONG× IPRit 0.902*
Rit 1.509*** 1.538*** 2.02
Number of obs. 300 300 300
Left-censored 85
Adjusted R2 0.571 0.580
Log likelihood −590.21
Wald Chi2
Note: The regressions include dummies for time fi ed effects.
∗ 10%.
∗∗ 5%.
∗∗∗ 1%.
to the level of education in China. Second, most of our
explanatory variables are proxies for some underlying
and typically unmeasurable phenomena. Some of these
proxies might end up picking up different factors at
once, and the interpretation of the estimates might turn
difficult As a conservative approach,we have therefore
tried to stay as close as possible to the related literature
in the choice of our proxies.
5. Empirical results
Table 4 (model 1) reports the OLS estimation of
Eq. (2) where the dependent variable is the logarithm
of the sum of the investment generated by any of the
three modes of international activity (wholly owned
operations, joint-ventures and technology licensing) in
country i and period t. In other words, we are proxing
the fl w of international activity with the value of the
investments in the recipient economy (i.e. the costs of
setting up the chemical plants).As a sensitive check,we
have also performed our analysis using the number of
plants rather than their value. Results hold unchanged.
INCOME and POP have a positive and significan
effect on the total fl w of international activity. DIST is
positive, although not significant suggesting that trans-
portation costs favor location of production in distant
countries vis-a`-vis exporting. OPEN is positive anda Model 2a Model 1b Model 2b
*** −37.18*** −14.34* −14.49*
9*** 1.776*** 0.402 0.369
5*** 1.574*** 1.017*** 1.014***
6 0.202 0.081 0.154
2** −0.453 −0.552 −0.628
9** 0.011*** 0.006 0.006
1 −0.130
0.125 0.005
1.278* −0.250
4*** 2.043*** 2.138*** 2.085***
300 300 300
85
−587.12
144.23 148.04
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Table 5
OLS estimations: SEFit and LOCALit
SEFit LOCALit
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
Constant −28.91*** −17.37*** −20.52*** −20.77***
INCOMEit 0.946*** 1.348*** 0.748*** 0.793**
POPit 1.279*** 1.765*** 1.103*** 1.205***
DISTi 0.636** 0.699* −0.069 −0.157
HUMANit −0.264 −0.494 −0.170 −0.191
OPENit 0.004 0.006 −0.003 0.003
IPRit −0.312 −0.059 −0.123 −0.079
Rit 0.800** 1.065** 0.820** 0.948**
Number of obs. 300 300 300 300
Left-censored 102 47
Adjusted R2 0.536 0.553
Log likelihood −565.07 −619.57
Note: The regressions include dummies for time fi ed effects.
∗ 10%.
∗∗ 5%.
∗∗∗ 1%.
significant meaning that more open countries tend to
attract larger fl ws of international activity. HUMAN
shows a negative coefficient although barely signifi
cant. At face value, this implies that the threat of imita-
tion outweighs the importance of absorptive capacity.11
The coefficien of R is positive and highly signifi
cant. This implies that increases in the country credit
ratings, our proxy for country risk, generate a larger
fl w of international activity in the recipient economy.
In dollar terms, this means that, in the average recip-
ient country, a 10% increase in R with respect to the
mean (about 46) generates an increment in the chemi-
cal investment driven by international activity of about
$200 million per period.12 IPR is positive, but not at all
significant At face value, this implies that IPRs pro-
tection does not play any role in conditioning the fl w
of international activity.
Since our sample includes mainly large firms one
could argue that these large corporations are better able
to insulate themselves against changes in the strength
of IPRs protection and that the effect of IPR is mostly
on small firms In Table 5, we address this possibility
11 One could also argue that foreign firm are less likely to enjoy
a technological advantage in countries with higher levels of human
capital, implying a negative relationship between HUMAN and the
fl w of international activity.
12 This is obviously a lower bound of the total effect since we only
consider large investors from developed countries.
by introducing a new dependent variable: SEFit. SEFit
is the investment in country i and period t generated by
the licensing activity of specialized engineering firm
(SEFs). SEFs are firm specialized in the design, en-
gineering and sometimes licensing of chemical plants,
but have no stakes in the product market. SEFs have
usually a much smaller size than chemical firms Es-
pecially compared to the firm of our sample, SEFs
are definitel small firms The results do not confir
our conjecture that small firm are more sensitive to
the protection offered by the patent system, and IPR
remains not significant 13
We have also performed a Tobit estimation (Table 4,
model 1a) of Eq. (2). Indeed, about 30% of the obser-
vations for our dependent variable show no investment
at all in a given country and for a given time period.
A Tobit estimation should account for the truncated (at
zero) dependent variable. Qualitative results hold un-
changed. Finally, we report the results of the random-
effects GLS regression (Table 4, model 1b), in which
the individual error terms are randomly distributed
13 Many SEFs also specialize in construction services, and can
provide “turnkey” plants to their customers. In addition, SEFs of-
ten act as licensing agents for chemical firms They offer complete
technology packages consisting of the core technology licensed from
chemical producers, along with know-how and installation and en-
gineering services. In these cases, IPRs protection is likely to be less
important.11
across cross-sectional units. The Lagrange multiplier
test and theHausman test suggest that there are country-
specifi random effects and that these are uncorrelated
with the exogenous variables.
As we discussed in Section 3, the fact that IPR has
no effect on international activity is not in contradic-
tion with the theory. Indeed, stronger IPRs generate
a market expansion effect and a market power effect.
Since the former is positive and the latter is negative,
the net effect is ambiguous. However, one can refin
the theory a bit more. As suggested by Smith (2001),
the risk of imitation is higher in countries with strong
imitative abilities. Hence, one should expect that it is
in these countries that the market expansion effect is
stronger. Instead, in countries with poor imitative abil-
ities an increase in IPRs protection would reinforce the
market power of the investor and could possibly lead
to a reduction in the fl w of international activity.
In order to test this additional implication of the the-
ory, we follow Smith’s (2001) methodology and divide
all our countries in two groups: countries with strong
imitative abilities and countries with weak imitative
abilities. We use the number of R&D scientists and en-
gineers to defin weak and strong imitative abilities.
We construct two dummy variables: DWEAK, which
takes the value of one if the country has weak imitative
abilities (i.e. less than 500 scientists and engineers per
million of population) and zero otherwise; DSTRONG,
which takes the value of one if the country has strong
imitative abilities (i.e. more than 500 scientists and en-
g
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Table 6
SUR estimations
WOij JVij LICij
Model 3a
Constant −37.447*** −35.273*** −24.856***
INCOMEit 0.795*** 0.609** 1.201***
POPit 0.973*** 0.828*** 1.159***
DISTi 0.974** 1.213*** 0.433
HUMANit 0.205 0.092 −0.640*
OPENit 0.006** 0.003 0.002
IPRit 0.243 −0.275 −0.428
Rit 1.960*** 1.183*** 0.945***
Number of obs. 300 300 300
R2 0.554 0.432 0.496
Model 3b
Constant −39.406*** −36.463*** −27.423***
INCOMEit 1.017*** 0.743*** 1.491***
POPit 1.020*** 0.857*** 1.220***
DISTi 0.838*** 1.130*** 0.253
HUMANit 0.445 0.237 −0.326
OPENit 0.007** 0.003 0.003
DWEAK× IPRit −0.064 −0.461 −0.829
DSTRONG× IPRit 0.644 −0.031 0.099
Rit 1.983*** 1.196** 0.974***
Number of obs. 300 300 300
R2 0.560 0.436 0.507
Note: The regressions include dummies for time fi ed effects.
∗ 10%.
∗∗ 5%.
∗∗∗ 1%.
tivity, taking into consideration the simultaneous char-
acter of the three modes. The empirical method is to
estimate Eq. (2) for the three modes by means of seem-
ingly unrelated regression (SUR) techniques. Table 6,
model 3a, reports the results of the SUR estimations of
Eq. (2).
Overall the results seem to confir the theoretical
predictions discussed in Section 3. INCOME and POP
are always positive and significan in all equations.
DIST is positive, but significan only for theWOand JV
equations, and OPEN is only significan and positive
in the WO equation. The latter findin might suggest
that more open countries tend to attract larger fl ws of
wholly owned operations. HUMAN is not significan
in any equation, but in the LIC equation where it takes
a negative sign. As far as it concerns country risk, the
focus of this paper, R is positive and highly significan
in all equations. The coefficien is considerably larger
for the fl w ofwholly owned operations, which support
our hypothesis 2. The coefficient of R in the LIC and
12ineers per million of population) and zero otherwise.
inally, we estimate an equation where these two dum-
ies are multiplied by the variable IPR. Results are
eported in Table 4, model 2 for OLS, model 2a for
obit and model 2b for GLS. As one can check, we do
ot fin any evidence of a significan impact of changes
n IPRs protection on the fl w of international activity
n countries with strong imitative abilities. Instead, we
o fin some weak evidence that countries with weak
mitative abilities are recipient of more international
ctivity when they implement a stricter enforcement of
PRs. This result is in contradiction with the theoretical
rgument illustrated above. We, however, take it with
xtreme caution because it not very robust and it dis-
ppears when we focus on each mode of international
ctivity separately (see below).
We can nowanalyze the impact of ourmain explana-
ory variables on any single form of international ac-
Table 7
OLS estimations at the sub-sector level
Oil refinin Petrochemicals Plastics and rubber Gas Organic chemicals
Constant −23.37*** −36.77*** −35.57*** −27.99*** −21.76***
INCOMEit 1.068*** 1.272*** 1.433*** 0.990*** 0.207
POPit 0.891*** 1.240*** 1.328*** 0.854** 1.116***
DISTi 0.318 0.876*** 0.713** 0.626* 0.324
HUMANit −0.301 0.111 0.010 −0.038 0.048
OPENit 0.009** 0.005 0.011*** 0.008** 0.008**
IPRit 1.013* −0.288 −0.256 0.832 0.016
Rit 0.806** 0.820** 0.667** 0.876** 1.642***
Number of obs. 225 225 225 225 225
Adjusted R2 0.396 0.530 0.592 0.431 0.532
Note: The regressions include dummies for time fi ed effects.
∗ 10%.
∗∗ 5%.
∗∗∗ 1%.
the JV equations are roughly similar (although bigger
in the JV equation), suggesting that these two modes
of international activity are equally affected by country
risk. IPR does not have a significan effect in any of the
three modes analyzed in this paper. Table 6, model 3b,
distinguishes between countries with strong imitative
abilities and countries with weak imitative abilities. All
coefficient remain basically unchanged. Our data do
not seem to suggest that there exist a market expansion
effect and a market power effect due to stronger IPRs.
Indeed, the coefficien of IPR is never significant not
even at the 10% level of confidence
Our fina hypothesis has to do with the different
responses to changes in country risk conditions that
one should expect from international and domestic
investment. We argued that international investment,
especially by large corporations, is much more foot-
loose and able to move to safer places. To contrast
this hypothesis, we have constructed another depen-
dent variable, LOCALit, which measures the invest-
ment in country i and period t by domestic enterprises.
Table 5 reports the results of the OLS estimation of
this new equation (along with the Tobit specification)
The coefficien of R is positive and significant How-
ever, its magnitude is much smaller than that of R in the
WO equation (Table 6, model 3a) where the dependent
variable is the investment in wholly owned plants in
country i and period t by the firm of our sample (large
chemical corporations). Overall, we can argue that our
results suggest that higher degrees of country risk have
a
ever, this effect is relatively stronger for investment by
large multinational corporations, which tend to shift to
modes with less resource commitment, and relatively
smaller for investment by local firms
One limitation of many studies that investigate the
relationship between IPRs protection and international
activity is that they aggregate fl ws of foreign direct
investments and technology licensing across many di-
verse industries, some of which might not rely at all on
the legal protection of intellectual property. By focus-
ing on a single industry we clearly reduce this hetero-
geneity. Yet, the chemical industry is a vast sector that
covers a myriad of different products from sophisti-
cated drugs to fertilizers, from polymers to coal-based
products. So far we have not tried to differentiate across
different sub-sectors. However, there might be impor-
tant differences. Indeed, for most process technologies
in petrochemicals, basic plastics and industrial gases
that had already matured by the 1980s patents were
probably much less a concern during the period under
study. By contrast, patents could be much more impor-
tant for drugs, specialty chemicals and newpolymers.14
To better control for systematic differences across
different chemical sub-sectors we have split our dataset
in different groups which aremeant to include products
with similar characteristics. We have run separate re-
14 Nevertheless, one should be aware that Chemintell only reports
investment in plants, and it only dealswith process technology.Wedo
n
on obvious negative effect on total investment. How-
ot have, for instance, product licensing, which is the major subject
f transaction in pharmaceuticals.
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gressions for each group. Table 7 reports the results of
our estimations for fi emain groups: oil refining petro-
chemicals, plastics and rubber, gas (which includes gas
handling, air separation, and industrial gases), and or-
ganic chemicals (which includes explosives, textile and
fibers food products, and pharmaceuticals). Our de-
pendent variable is the logarithm of the sum of the
investment generated by our three modes of interna-
tional activity in any of the above mentioned groups.
Notice that we have only three time periods since the
sub-sector classificatio of Chemintell has changed af-
ter 1991. The sign of IPR is sometimes positive and
sometimes negative, but almost never significant It is
positive and significan at the 10% level only in the Oil
Refinin equation. Contrary to what one could expect
it is not significan in the organic chemicals equation,
where pharmaceuticals is included.15
6. Conclusions and discussion
This paper has focused on country risk and IPRs
protection as determinants of international activity by
means of wholly owned operations, joint-ventures and
technology licensing. We have shown that the whole
fl w of international activity into a recipient economy
is negatively related to the level of country risk. More-
over, this effect holds for all three modes considered in
our analysis. The relative effect is stronger for modes
which involve greater commitment with the recipient
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justifications First, our measure of IPRs protection
reflect mainly statutory protection that might actually
differ from the real protection (whether patent laws are
enforced or not). Second, as reported by Cohen et al.
(2000), patents are considered by firm as one of the
less effective means to protect their intellectual prop-
erty. This is especially true for process innovations,
the ones we consider in the paper. So, in light of their
findings the fact that changes in patent protection
do not affect international technology fl ws does not
appear to be too surprising. Third, in a world where
international treaties are becoming more enforced, a
fir can sue for infringement in other jurisdictions
(e.g. outside the host country). So, if the host IPRs
regime is weak, the fir might still have recourse
elsewhere (e.g. the WTO). Finally, even if IPRs pro-
tection affects neither the volume nor the composition
of international activity, it might still affect the type of
technology that is transferred. Firms might respond to
lower levels of IPRs protection by transferring older
vintage technologies (Fosfuri, 2000). With our data,
we are not able to investigate this possibility.
At face value, our results suggest that governments
in less developed countries keen to attract foreign in-
vestment and technology should pay greater attention
to the quality of the business environment and to in-
vestment conditions rather than offeringmore statutory
protection to IPRs. Needless to say, improving coun-
try risk conditions is neither easy nor rapid. A statutory
change in IPRs protection or the formal participation to
a
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dountry, such as wholly owned operations. Finally, we
ave shown that multinational investment is more re-
ponsive to risk conditions than domestic investment.
By contrast, after controlling for other country
haracteristics, we do not fin evidence of a significan
ffect of IPRs protection on international activity.
lthough surprising, this findin has some plausible
15 As an additional effort to control for sources of heterogeneity
cross different chemical products, we have also explored a range
f discrete choice models where the dependent variable is the prob-
bility, at the plant level, to choose among our three modes of in-
ernational expansion. As regressors we employed the same country
ariables used in this paper along with a set of controls for products’
nd firms heterogeneity. Interesting enough, IPRs protection does
ot seem to be significan in conditioning the mode choice. We also
in that in countries with better risk conditions the probability that
foreign fir opts for a wholly owned plant is higher. For further
etails, see Fosfuri (2002).n international IPRs agreement are much easier poli-
ies to implement. However, our paper shows they are
ot very effective.
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Appendix A
A.1. List of countries used in the empirical
estimations
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh,
Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Ger-
many (West), Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong
Kong, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Is-
rael, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea,
Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Portugal, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South
Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland,
Syria, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, USA, Uganda,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
A.2. Firms of our sample and their nationality
3M (USA), Abbott (USA), AGA (SWE), Air
Liquide (FRA), Air Products (USA), Akzo (NET),
Allied-Signal (USA), American Home Products
(USA), Amoco (USA), ARCO (USA), Aristech
Chemical (USA), Asahi Chemical (JAP), Ashland Oil
(USA), Atochem (FRA), Avon (USA), BASF (WGE),
Baxter-Travenol (USA), Bayer (WGE), Beecham
(UK), BF Goodrich (USA), BOC (UK), Boehringer
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(FIN), Kuraray (JAP), Kyowa Hakko (JAP), Laporte
(USA), Lonza (SWI), Lubrizol (USA), Lyondell
Petrochemical (USA), Merck & Co (USA), Mitsubishi
Chemical (JAP), Mitsubishi Gas Chemical (JAP),
Mitsubishi Petrochemical (JAP), Mitsubishi Rayon
(JAP), Mitsui Petrochemical (JAP), Mitsui Toatsu
(JAP), Mobil (USA), Monsanto (USA), Montedison
(ITA), Morton Norwich (USA), Nalco (USA), Neste
(FIN), NL Chemicals (USA), Nobel Industries (SWE),
Norsk Hydro (NOR), Nova (CAN), Occidental
(USA), Olin (USA), ORKEM (FRA), Otsuka (JAP),
P & G (USA), Pennwalt (USA), Perstorp (SWE),
Petrofin (BEL), Pfize (USA), Pharmacia (SWE),
Phillips (USA), PPG (USA), Quantum (USA), Reckitt
& Colman (UK), Repsol (SPA), Revlon (USA),
Rhone-Poulenc (FRA), Rohm (WGE), Rohm & Haas
(USA), Rorer Group (USA), Rutgerswerke (WGE),
RWE (WGE), Sandoz (SWI), Sankyo (JAP), Sanof
(FRA), Schering (WGE), Shell (UK-NET), Shin-Etsu
Chemical (JAP), Shionogi (JAP), Shiseido (JAP),
Showa Denko (JAP), SmithKline (USA), Snia (ITA),
Solvay (BEL), Squibb (USA), Sumitomo (JAP), Sun
(USA), Syntex (USA), Taisho Pharmaceuticals (JAP),
Takeda Chemical (JAP), Tanabe Seiyaku (JAP), Teijin
(JAP), Tenneco (USA), Texaco (USA), Toray Indus-
tries (JAP), Toso (JAP), Toyobo (JAP), Ube (WGE),
UCB (BEL), Unilever (UK-NET), Union Carbide
(USA), Unitika (JAP), Unocal (USA), Upjohn (USA),
Warner-Lambert (USA), Wellcome Foundation (UK),
Witco (USA), Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical (JAP).
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Angelheim (WGE), Boehringer Mannheim (WGE),
orden (USA), Borg Warner (USA), BP (UK),
ristol-Myers (USA), Cabot (USA), Ciba-Geigy
SWI), Colgate-Palmolive (USA), Cookson (UK),
ourtaulds (UK), Cyanamid (USA), Chevron (USA),
aiichi (JAP), Dainippon (JAP), Degussa (WGE),
ow Chemical (USA), DSM (NET), Du Pont (USA),
yno (NOR), Eastman Kodak (USA), Eisai (JAP),
lf Aquitaine (FRA), Eli Lilly (USA), EMC (FRA),
niChem (ITA), Ethyl Corp (USA), Exxon (USA),
erro (USA), FMC (USA), Fujisawa Pharmaceutical
JAP), Gechem (BEL), General Electric (USA), Geor-
ia Gulf (USA), Glaxo (UK), Goodyear (USA), Grace
R (USA), Henkel (WGE), Henley (USA), Hercules
USA), Hoechst (WGE), Hoffmann-LaRoche (SWI),
uls (WGE), Huntsman Chemical (USA), ICI (UK),
MC (USA), Japan Synthetic Rubber (JAP), Johnson
Jonson (USA), Kanebo (JAP), Kao (JAP), Kemiraeferences
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